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Governing Assessing the 1993
Massachusetts Massachusetts
Public Schools Education Reform
Act
John Portz
The Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 created a number of important
changes in public education. In the area of local governance, the act was guided
by a corporate model in which authority and responsibilities were reallocated
among school committees, superintendents, principals, and newly created school
councils. School committees in particular assumed a policymaking role, and super-
intendents became the chief executive officers of their school districts. This article,
based on responses to a mail sur\-ey, is an early assessment of the act's governance
changes. Superintendents are most satisfied with their role, especially their author-
ity over principals and teachers. School committee members are least satisfied
with the changes, although they still provide general support for the goals of the
act. Although they are concerned about their job security under the ne^v system,
principals are supportive. A comparison of the corporate model of governance with
political leadership and shared governance models indicates that two important
challenges lie ahead: developing support from other local political leaders and
fostering a cooperative environment among local governance actors.
American public education is one of the most central institutions in our society, yet
it is also one of the most troubled. Dissatisfaction with public schools is a recur-
ring theme in the media, among policymakers, and for the general public. Low test
scores, poor pedagogy, weak management, and a host of other criticisms are heard fre-
quently. Proposed solutions are many. Various "waves" of reform, from statewide stan-
dards to restructuring, have swept through school systems in recent years. 1 Criticisms,
however, continue.
Educational governance is on the target list of problems as weD as solutions. Gover-
nance, which involves the establishment of educational goals and the allocation of re-
sources, is fraught with controversy and debate. Goal setting raises controversial ques-
tions about the very purpose of teaching and learning; resource allocation involves the
contentious division of limited and often shrinking resources. The critique of school
governance ranges from the lack of parental and community participation in the gover-
nance process to incompetence of educational professionals to deliver education effec-
tively in the classroom. Solutions are equally broad from enhancing the parental role
with school vouchers to reallocating responsibilities among educational professionals.
John Portz. associate professor. Department of Political Science. Northeastern L'niversiry.
teaches and writes about state and local public policy, emphasizing education and eco-
nomic development.
125
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
This article focuses on one piece of the governance debate: the allocation of author-
ity and responsibility among educational professionals and leaders at the local level.
My analysis is based on a case study of governance changes under the Massachusetts
Education Reform Act of 1993. This act, described below, adopted a corporate model of
governance in which important educational responsibilities were reallocated among
superintendents, principals, school committee members, and school councils. Superin-
tendents, for example, became the chief executive officers of school districts, while
school committees became policymaking boards. The following analysis, based on mail
survey responses from superintendents, school committee members, and principals, is
an early assessment of these important changes under the act.
Governance Models
Educational governance can be achieved in a variety of ways. One prominent example
is a decentralization model in which governance responsibilities are moved to the
school level. 2 The thrust of this reform movement is to shift decision making around
goals and resource allocation to the individual school. School-based management, for
example, appears in various forms as a means to empower local school councils com-
posed of teachers, parents, and principals. Under school-based management, many of
the key decisions that shape the learning environment are made in each school building.
Chicago, Miami, and other cities have experimented with this governance reform.
A market model of governance, in which competition is the key dynamic, comprises
another popular reform. Vouchers and school choice, for example, are forms of gover-
nance in which schools compete for the attention of educational consumers, that is,
parents and students. 3 In this competitive model, governance arrangements are a
byproduct of consumer choice. Successful governance is among the attributes of those
schools which succeed in the educational market by attracting more students.
Many popular reforms combine elements of both the market and decentralization
models. The charter school movement, for example, encourages competition among
schools as well as a school-based approach to educational governance. Charter schools
operate under a contractual arrangement with public authorities, but they are outside the
direct supervision of traditional public school authorities and have increased flexibility
to alter curriculum, hours, and other aspects of the learning environment.4 Privatization
is another reform movement that builds upon these models, particularly the market
model. In Baltimore, for example, the private firm of Educational Alternatives, Inc.,
was hired to operate a number of schools in the city school system. 5
The traditional governance model, however, focuses more squarely on public-sector
actors. Superintendents, local school boards, mayors, state boards of education, state
legislators, governors, and even members of the U.S. Department of Education are pub-
he actors who assume governance roles. Debates over governance reform often center
on the proper allocation of authority and responsibility among these various players in a
federal system.
There are three variations of the traditional governance model at the local level. One
variation, a corporate model of governance, is the focus of this article.6 Central to this
model is a clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities among governance actors.
School board members, for example, concentrate on the broad issues of educational
policy; superintendents focus on implementing board policies. Each governance per-
former should be held accountable for his or her actions and responsibilities. As the
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chief legislative sponsor of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act writes, "Account-
ability is the key to successful education reform." 7 With the business world as a guide,
the corporate model argues for a separation of policy and management that is character-
istic of the relationship between a corporation's board of directors and the chief execu-
tive officer.
Shared governance is a second variation of the traditional model. Rather than empha-
size a sorting out of authority and responsibilities, as in the corporate model, it high-
lights dialogue and interdependence among governance actors. 8 In this model goal set-
ting and resource allocation are shared responsibilities; communication and cooperation
become critical. 9 School committee members and superintendents, for example, must
develop a high level of trust and respect that facilitates the sharing of responsibilities
and tasks. Similarly, superintendents and principals become partners in the management
of the school system. Collective, rather than individual, accountability is characteristic
of this model. Shared governance can even be expanded to include community actors,
thereby creating networks in which collaboration and creative dialogue become criti-
cal. 10
A third variation focuses on political leadership. In Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, and
several other cities, mayors have assumed a central governance role in their respective
school systems. 11 In Boston, for example, Mayor Thomas Menino appoints members of
the school committee and has taken a leading role in educational goal setting and the
allocation of resources. As the mayor stated in a 1996 speech, "I want to be judged as
your mayor by what happens now in the Boston public schools. I expect you to hold me
accountable ... If I fail, judge me harshly." 12 The mayor of Chicago has also assumed a
major role in his city's schools. Labeled by one group of researchers as "integrated
governance," this centralization of authority under Mayor Richard Daley appoints mem-
bers of the school board and exercises considerable control over the allocation of re-
sources to the schools. 13
Local Level Educational Governance: Education Reform
The Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 covered a broad range of educational
activities, including school finance, teacher certification, learning standards, and cur-
riculum models as well as governance. In the last area, the corporate model clearly
guided the reform efforts. As the state Department of Education notes in a publication
explaining the act, "We view the school committee as the publicly elected or appointed
equivalent of a board of directors of a corporation . . . [and] the superintendent serves as
the school committee's chief executive officer and educational advisor." 14 With this
model as a guide, governance responsibilities were reallocated among four local bodies:
school committees, superintendents, principals, and newly created school councils.
The major reform thrust for school committees is an emphasis on their policymaking
role. Their major responsibilities are to
• establish educational goals and policies;
• negotiate and approve collective bargaining agreements;
• vote on school choice policy;
• adopt general disciplinary policies;
• approve all school department expenditures;
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• review and approve the budget;
• hire superintendent and several other identified districtwide personnel;
• establish compensation policy for principals;
• establish performance standards for all personnel; and
• adopt a professional development plan for all personnel.
The most significant authority removed from school committees is the hiring of prin-
cipals and teachers. A superintendent no longer submits to the school committee the
names of candidates for principal and teaching positions.
Superintendents, on the other hand, assume administrative and management respon-
sibilities. As chief executive officer of the schools, superintendents are responsible for
the day-to-day operations of their school districts. In this context, major responsibilities
include:
• appointing principals and other personnel not assigned to specific
schools;
• reviewing and approving the appointment of teachers and staff proposed
by principals;
• publishing the school committees' district policies on teacher and
student conduct;
• recommending employee performance standards to the school commit-
tees;
9 maintaining records on all students and staff and filing a detailed
annual report;
• reviewing and approving the process for the formation of school
councils; and
• overseeing the general operation of their school districts.
The most significant new responsibilities for superintendents are in the personnel
area. Superintendents now have total authority over hiring principals and indirect con-
trol over hiring teachers.
Principals are also recognized as key actors in school governance. Although they are
appointed by superintendents, each of them has considerable authority over the alloca-
tion of resources within his or her school building. Major responsibilities include:
• administering and managing resources within the school;
• suspending and expelling students;
• hiring and firing all teachers and school staff, subject to approval of
the superintendent, relevant collective bargaining agreements, and state
law;
• establishing and serving as cochair of the school council.
Increased accountability is the purported theme of the Reform Act for principals.
They exercise greater authority over school personnel and are individually accountable
for teaching and learning in their school buildings. Significantly, principals, defined as
managers, can no longer engage in collective bargaining. Each principal negotiates an
individual employment contract (up to three years) with his or her superintendent.
Finally, the Reform Act required the creation of a school council in each school in
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the state. These councils are composed of teachers, parents, community members,
principals, and at the high school level, students. Through the councils the Reform Act
encourages the participation and involvement of parents, teachers, and community
members in the governance of individual schools. The major responsibilities of coun-
cils include:
• advising the principal in setting educational goals and school policies,
as well as reviewing the school budget; and
• preparing and reviewing an annual school improvement plan.
Evaluating the Impact of Governance Changes
To assess the impact of these changes, I sent a survey questionnaire to all Massachu-
setts school committee members, superintendents, and principals. Of the 4,310 ques-
tionnaires mailed, 957 (22 percent) were returned. (See Appendix A for a discussion of
the survey.) In addition to demographic questions, the survey posed a number of ques-
tions concerning governance changes under the Education Reform Act. Questions
probed the level of satisfaction with a respondent's governance role, the impact and
importance of governance changes, and the support for or opposition to other possible
governance changes. My analysis focused on the similarities and differences among
responses by the three local governance actors. Their impressions and self-reported
experiences of educational professionals and leaders form the basis for the following
assessment of the corporate governance model adopted in Massachusetts.
General Assessment of Roles
On a measure of general "satisfaction" with their governance role, superintendents are
clearly the most satisfied with changes under the Education Reform Act. Survey re-
spondents were asked, "How satisfied are you in your current governance role?" The
average responses for all three groups are provided in Table 1
.
Table 1
Satisfaction in Current Governance Role
Dissatisfied Satisfied
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.2
Superintendents 4.0
Principals 3.3
The feeling of satisfaction among superintendents is striking: an average score of
4.0. In fact, 75 percent of superintendents circled 4 or 5; only 9 percent expressed
dissatisfaction by circling 1 or 2. To be certain, some superintendents complained of
continuing micromanagement by school committees, but the overall level of satisfac-
tion is quite high.
In contrast, school committee members are the least satisfied among the three types
of governance actors. In response to the same question, the average response is only
3.2. Only 43 percent of school committee members circled 4 or 5, while 33 percent
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expressed dissatisfaction by circling 1 or 2. Principals lie in the middle on this measure
of satisfaction, with an average score of 3.3. In response to the question, 52 percent of
principals circled 4 or 5, and 29 percent circled 1 or 2.
A second question concerning general governance roles reveals a similar trend.
Question 3 of the survey uses a 1 to 5 scale for the following question: "In the alloca-
tion of governance responsibilities in your district, how would you rate the role of each
of the following [school committee, superintendent, principal, school council]."
Too Weak Just Right Too Strong12 3 4 5
From this perspective, 81 percent of superintendents describe their role as "just
right"; only 13 percent viewed it on the weak side of the scale (1 and 2). This was the
highest self-assessment score among all three groups. Furthermore, superintendents
look favorably on the role of the other two governance categories. With respect to the
role of principals, for example, 85 percent of superintendents view the principal's role
as "just right." The role of school committees rates a slightly lower 75 percent "just
right" score, while school councils score 70 percent on the same measure. In general,
superintendents appear to be quite satisfied with their role as chief executive officer of a
school system.
School committees, again, show a sharp contrast and different assessment of their
governance role. In assessing it, only 41 percent of the members rate it as "just right,"
while 53 percent rate it weak (scores 1 and 2). Clearly, school committee members have
concerns over their role in governance. Not surprisingly, this cohort also questions the
roles of other governance participants. Although 48 percent of committee members
view the superintendent's role as "just right," an almost equal number, 44 percent, rate
it on the strong side (scores 4 and 5). For principals, the picture presents a greater split:
51 percent of the members view the principals' role as "just right," with the remainder
divided between weak and strong. Finally, 41 percent of school committee members
view school councils as weak (scores 1 and 2) , while 37 percent rate them "just right."
Principals again fall in the middle, although their assessment lies closer to that of
school committee members than of superintendents. In assessing their own role, a bare
majority, 52 percent, rate their role as "just right." In contrast, 39 percent of principals
offer a self-assessment on the weak side of the scale. In light of this judgment, a signifi-
cant number of principals view the role of other governance actors as too strong. With
school committees, for example, 53 percent of principals perceive the committee role as
"just right," while 35 percent perceive it as strong. The pattern is almost identical for
superintendents: 52 percent of principals consider the superintendent's role as "just
right," while 37 percent consider it as strong. With school councils, however, principals
are more sympathetic. For these partners at the school level, 62 percent of principals
think their role is "just right," while 29 percent think it is weak.
Assessing the Importance of Changes
To assess the relative importance of specific changes under the Massachusetts Educa-
tion Reform Act, the survey uses a 1 to 5 scale for the following question: "Listed
below are major governance changes under the Education Reform Act. Regardless of
the impact on your district, how important do you think each is in improving educa-
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tional governance?" The tables below list the average response for the three types of
governance personnel.
School Committees and Superintendents
One of the most important changes under the Education Reform Act involves a shift in
school committee responsibility from general hiring decisions to a policymaking board
that hires only the superintendent. The companion to this change is the assumption of
authority by superintendents to hire principals and teachers. These two changes are
central to the corporate model that was instrumental in guiding reform legislation:
board of directors (school committee) making policy and chief executive officer (super-
intendent) responsible for hiring.
The assessment of each change is reported in Tables 2 and 3. Each change was per-
ceived as quite important in school governance, particularly by superintendents. For
both survey questions, the average response for superintendents is 4.8. In the case of
each question, 85 percent of superintendents circled 5 on the response scale. In contrast,
school committee members are less inclined to view this change as very important.
Their average response is 3.8 or 3.9 for these questions. For the first question, only 39
percent of school committee members circled 5, and for the second question only 35
percent did so. Principals fall between the two, although they are more closely aligned
with superintendents. Their average response rating is 4.6 and 4.4, respectively, for the
two changes. In general, the responses indicate a fairly strong endorsement of the cor-
porate model of governance, although school committee members have significant
reservations.
Table 2
Hiring Authority
(School committees' focus on policy and budget with less hiring authority)
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.9
Superintendents 4.8
Principals 4.6
Table 3
Superintendents' Responsibility for Hiring Principals
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.8
Superintendents 4.8
Principals 4.4
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Principals
For principals, several of the changes under the act are greeted with considerable sup-
port. In particular, those which enhance the authority of principals are perceived as
important to educational governance. The authority of principals to hire teachers, for
example, receives strong endorsement (see Table 4). The average response for princi-
pals is 4.8, with 82 percent of principals circling 5. Superintendents are also highly
supportive of this change. Their average response is 4.6, with 71 percent circling 5. Not
surprisingly, school committee members, who lose authority under this change, see it as
less important to improving governance. Their average response is 4.0, and only 38
percent circled 5.
Table 4
Principals' Responsibility for Hiring Teachers
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 4.0
Superintendents 4.6
Principals 4.8
Enhanced authority for principals over student discipline receives an approximately
similar level of support from all parties. As Table 5 indicates, school committee mem-
bers, principals, and superintendents gave an average response of either 4.1 or 4.3.
Table 5
Principals' Authority over Student Discipline
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 4.1
Superintendents 4.3
Principals 4.3
One final change regarding principals, namely, their removal from collective bar-
gaining, receives less support as important to governance, particularly by them (see
Table 6). This controversial provision in the Education Reform Act is deemed by many
principals to be a removal of protections from arbitrary actions by superintendents. The
principals' average response is only 3.2. Equally significant, 33 percent of principals
circled 1 , indicating strong sentiment against this change. On the other hand, many
superintendents and school committee members regarded this change as an important
step in enhancing principals' accountability. The average response of both of these
groups is 4.0.
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Table 6
Principals' Loss of Collective Bargaining
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 4.0
Superintendents 4.0
Principals 3.2
School Councils
A final area of change involves the creation of school councils. These site-based advi-
sory groups are newly created under the Education Reform Act. Support for school
councils is fairly consistent across respondents (see Tables 7 and 8), although the level
of importance in educational governance is less than that attributed to several other
changes, particularly the changes in policymaking and personnel responsibilities.
Table 7
School Councils' Advice to Principals
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.8
Superintendents 3.9
Principals 3.7
Table 8
School Councils and Principals' Development
of Improvement Plans
Not Important Very Important
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3 .
9
Superintendents 4.1
Principals 4.0
Possible Changes in Educational Governance
In addition to the changes made under the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, a
number of other governance reforms are under consideration or are the subject of de-
bate. Another part of the survey used a 1 to 5 scale (strongly oppose to strongly support)
for the following question: "Listed below are possible changes in educational gover-
nance and policymaking. Would you support or oppose these changes?"
School Committees
For school committees, one possible change is to restore their hiring authority, prima-
rily the choice of principals. Survey respondents were asked whether they supported or
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opposed allowing school committees to vote on the hiring and dismissal of principals.
Under the new Education Reform Act, superintendents have sole responsibility in this
area. Not surprisingly, this change receives support from school committee members,
with an average response of 3.8, but strong opposition from superintendents, whose
average response is 1.5. In fact, 70 percent of superintendents, indicating their strong
opposition, circled 1. Principals, 51 percent of whose responses to a hiring process that
opens their appointment to the scrutiny of school committees circled 1, were also
strongly opposed to this change (see Table 9).
Table 9
Should School Committees Vote on Hiring
and Dismissing Principals?
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.8
Superintendents 1.5
Principals 2.1
One method of limiting the likely scope of school committee action — restricting
school committees to quarterly meetings — also sparks divergent responses (see Table
10). School committee members, not surprisingly, strongly oppose such restrictions.
Their average response is 1 .4, with 80 percent of them circling 1 . Superintendents,
however, find more merit in this proposal. Their average response score of 3.7 indicates
sympathy with a change that might lessen micromanagement of the school system by
the school committee. Principals, with an average response of 3.3, evidence a more
neutral position on this change.
Table 10
Limiting School Committees to Quarterly Meetings
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongiy Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 1.4
Superintendents 3.7
Principals 3.3
Finally, a more radical change in choosing school committees — appointment rather
than election — receives general opposition from all parties, particularly school com-
mittee members, whose average response is 1.8 (see Table 11). It appears that despite
their support by former governor William Weld, this concept and Boston's experiment
with an appointed committee have little advocacy among local educational leaders
around the state.
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Table 11
Allowing Local Communities to Appoint School Committees
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 1.8
Superintendents 2.1
Principals 2.6
Superintendents
Two possible changes in the responsibility and authority of superintendents receive
mixed responses. One proposed change is to require superintendents to negotiate labor
contracts, which is currently the responsibility of school committees. It can be argued,
however, that this is not an appropriate function for a policymaking board. Rather, it is
a management function that should rest with the chief executive officer of the corpora-
tion. Such a proposal draws divergent responses (see Table 12), with school committee
members generally opposed (2.5), principals in favor (4.1), and superintendents slightly
opposed (2.8).
Table 12
Requiring Superintendents to Negotiate Labor Contracts
Strongiy Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 2.5
Superintendents 2.8
Principals 4.1
A second change would reduce superintendents' authority by removing the require-
ment that a superintendent approve the hiring and dismissal of teachers. Under the Edu-
cation Reform Act, principals have primary responsibility for teacher personnel deci-
sions, but superintendents retain final approval authority. This proposed change draws
quite strong opposition from school committee members (2.0) and superintendents
(1.6). Opposition is particularly strong among superintendents, of whom 70 percent
circled 1 on the survey. Principals generally support this change, but their level of sup-
port is mild (3.3) compared with the opposition of the other two groups.
Table 13
Allowing Principals Sole Authority to Hire and Fire Teachers
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 2.0
Superintendents 1.6
Principals 3.3
Principals
The authority and responsibility of principals is another important governance area.
One proposed change, to involve them in the teachers' collective bargaining process, is
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designed to enhance the accountability of principals. Since collective bargaining contracts
often restrict the authority of principals and other administrators, a role for principals
in the process appears logical. The reaction, however, is mixed among respondents.
School committee members, who probably perceive this as a loss of authority, tend to
oppose such a change (2.6), and principals generally support (3.6) it, although neither
group stakes out a strong position on this issue.
Table 14
Allowing Principals to Participate in
Teachers' Collective Bargaining
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 2 .
6
Superintendents 3.2
Principals 3.6
Job security is a second important issue for principals. Under the Education Reform
Act, principals are no longer allowed to participate in collective bargaining and avail
themselves of concomitant job protections. Many principals perceive this as threat to
their positions and a change that undermines their accountability. A proposal to require
minimum two-year contracts for principals receives support or a neutral response (see
Table 15). Support by principals is particularly strong (4.6); 73 percent of them circled 5.
Table 15
Requiring Minimum Two-year Contracts for Principals
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.1
Superintendents 3.4
Principals 4.6
School Councils
A general reluctance to expand the scope of governance is evident in a question that
proposes to give school councils authority over a portion of the school budget. School
councils possess only advisory authority under the act; they lack the decision-making
and financial authority that is often sought by advocates of school-based management.
This proposal, however, is generally opposed by educational professionals (see Table
16). Superintendents (2.0) and school committee members (2.2), in particular, tend to
thwart such a diminution of their authority.
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Table 16
Giving School Councils Authority over
Part of the School Budget
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 2.2
Superintendents 2.0
Principals 2.8
Other Changes
The reluctance to share governance responsibilities is even more evident when the
proposal is made to allow municipal officials more authority in collective bargaining.
Under the Education Reform Act, the chief executive in each city or town — the mayor
or town manager — sits with the school committee to vote on collective bargaining
contracts. The intent of this provision is to involve municipal officials, who are respon-
sible for the allocation of funds to all departments, including the schools, a greater role
in determining how funds are spent. Education leaders, particularly superintendents,
oppose an expansion of authority for municipal officials (see Table 17).
Table 17
Increasing Municipal Officials' Authority
in Collective Bargaining
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 2.3
Superintendents 1.6
Principals 2.4
A final proposal reveals a general ambivalence on the part of local education leaders
toward significant changes within the school system. This proposal would enable local
districts to establish within-district charter schools. Like Boston's pilot schools, the
charter schools would be exempt from many regulations and procedures mandated by
the district office and labor contracts, but the individual schools would still be part of
the local school district. This proposal receives a generally neutral response from re-
spondents, although superintendents indicate mild support (see Table 18).
Table 18
Allowing Local Districts to Establish Charter Schools
Strongly Oppose Neutral Strongly Support
1 2 3 4 5
School committees 3.1
Superintendents 3.4
Principals 3.0
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In general, governance changes under the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993
receive support from educational leaders at the local level. Superintendents, particularly,
are satisfied with their new role and responsibilities as the chief executive officers of the
school system. School committee members and principals express a number of concerns,
but they also are generally supportive of the overall thrust of the act.
One of its most important changes — the reallocation of hiring and dismissal author-
ity — is supported by governance actors, albeit with some significant reservations. Un-
der reallocation, school committees are restricted to hiring and dismissing superinten-
dents (and a few others in districtwide positions); superintendents, who hire and dismiss
principals, have final approval of teachers and other school-based personnel; and princi-
pals assume primary responsibility for hiring and dismissing teachers and others in their
buildings.
Schools are slowly adjusting to this new allocation of responsibilities. Thus far,
superintendents appear to be most satisfied with their role. Their authority over the key
official at each school, the principal, is enhanced considerably. A majority of school
committee members, on the other hand, are concerned about their loss of authority over
personnel, particularly principals. In fact, 68 percent of school committee members
support (circled 4 or 5) resumption of their power to hire and dismiss principals. Princi-
pals, for their part, strongly endorse their authority to hire and dismiss teachers, thereby
enhancing their accountability for the quality of teaching. Some principals, however,
remain troubled about collective bargaining restrictions and legal roadblocks to dismiss-
ing teachers. As one elementary principal writes, "Why not put teachers on the same
one-to-three-year contracts and abolish tenure and professional status? Do that and
you'll revolutionize education overnight."
Furthermore, many principals are disturbed about their new status outside collective
bargaining. A common refrain is that they are vulnerable to the whims of the superin-
tendent. As another elementary principal writes, changes should be made to "reduce a
superintendent's power— absolute power corrupts; principals are at the mercy of super-
intendents." Emphasizing this point, 88 percent of principals support (circled 4 or 5)
requiring a minimum two-year contract for individuals in their position.
School councils, newly created under the Education Reform Act, receive general
support from participants in the survey. School improvement plans, which are approved
by school councils, also receive a favorable rating. One principal writes, "The school
improvement plan helps to bring together the vision, goals, and objectives for the
school from principal, staff, and parents."
In general, school committee members, superintendents, and principals favor many
of the act's reforms, but they are also cautious and protective of their authority and
position. When faced with reforms that might alter the balance of power, local actors
are typically opposed or neutral. Appointed school committees, for example, are op-
posed by all three groups. Similarly, more extensive budget authority for school coun-
cils is opposed, chiefly by school committees and superintendents. All three groups are
opposed to granting municipal officials more authority in the collective bargaining
process, and they are generally neutral about the prospect of creating within-district
charter schools. For these educational leaders, there are limits to the acceptable scope
of educational reform. Future legislative proposals to alter the governance framework
need to take this cautious perspective into consideration or risk strong opposition from
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major educational constituencies.
The Massachusetts Education Reform Act is inspired by a corporate model of educa-
tional governance. The essence of this model is a sorting-out or demarcation of respon-
sibilities among governance actors. A policymaking board of directors, the local school
committee, and a managing chief executive officer, the superintendent, are central to
this model. In addition, school principals are to take charge of their individual build-
ings, and school councils provide a forum for teacher, parent, student, and community
input to the decision-making process.
On the basis of the self-assessments of school committee members, superintendents,
and principals, the Education Reform Act has generally been effective in clarifying
governance responsibilities and enhancing accountability. However, major challenges
he ahead. In fact, the two other variations of the public-sector approach to governance
outlined earlier — political leadership and shared governance — point to two of them.
Each variant points to a different piece of reality in the world of educational gover-
nance.
From a political leadership perspective, the key challenge is the development of
support for public education from among political and community leaders outside the
schools. This is an external concern generally lacking in the corporate model, which
instead focuses on policy development and management within the school system.
School committees focus on educational policies; superintendents concentrate on
systemwide administrative and management responsibilities; and principals are con-
cerned with the operations of their own school. Under a corporate model, fostering
broad political support from external constituencies in the community is not central to
the tasks of these governance actors. Mayors and city councillors, for example, are not
of major concern from a corporate model perspective. Indeed, this model eschews the
political world for the bias and influence that it might exert over a policy and manage-
ment process which should focus on educational rather than political matters.
The political leadership model, however, poses a different reality in which broad
political support for education is critical. This perspective is particularly pertinent in
Massachusetts, whose school districts are fiscally dependent on local governments. The
latter, composed of city councils, mayors, managers, and others, must approve the over-
all school appropriation. If the schools lose favor with these political leaders, the school
budget suffers. Of course, the funding formula of the Education Reform Act requires a
certain level of local fiscal support for the schools, but this is essentially a minimum. To
go beyond this level, local government leaders must be convinced that the schools merit
additional funding. Thus, governance actors must add to their duties the political tasks
of seeking and lobbying for support, particularly fiscal support, from these leaders.
In this context, it is interesting to note that Boston stands apart from other state com-
munities, for, unlike other school districts' system of independently electing school
committees, the city's mayor appoints the members. Boston thus benefits from a politi-
cal leadership approach to governance that has translated into considerable fiscal and
administrative support for the school system. As noted earlier, Boston's Mayor Menino
has staked his political future on improving the schools.
The second major challenge is apparent from the shared governance approach. From
this perspective, the critical concern is how to build an environment of cooperation and
mutual respect. As this model emphasizes, governance in local school districts often
defies the demarcation and sorting-out rationale of the corporate perspective. As one
educational association notes, "[The] line between policy and administration is rarely
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clear-cut." 15 Dialogue and interdependence can be as important as division of authority
and responsibilities. The question, then, is whether the corporate model can foster this
cooperative environment while retaining its emphasis on the policy-management distinc-
tions.
A major challenge to building a cooperative environment comes from suspicions and
divisions among governance actors. Under the Education Reform Act, for example, the
job insecurity noted by many principals can be disruptive to the development of shared
governance. Many principals perceive their position as subject to the whims of the super-
intendent. The act's intent is to make principals more accountable for their schools, but
so mandating, it also increases the authority of superintendents over principals. The
result has not always been a more cooperative environment for governance. As one prin-
cipal noted, policymakers need to "rethink collective bargaining for principals — we are
much too vulnerable in our present position."
A Public Agenda Foundation study raised a similar point in its conclusion that build-
ing a cooperative environment is the critical step in educational reform. 16 "Good ideas
about curricula, textbooks, tests, financing and governance will founder if the parties
who must implement them cannot get along." 17 One superintendent in this study com-
pared his school district to a "giant dysfunctional family," while in several communities
surveyed, educational reform fell "victim to division, factionalism, and gridlock." 18 In
Massachusetts as well, fostering a cooperative environment is difficult. As one superin-
tendent notes, "There has been a distinct and open polarization of school committees
and superintendents. In fact, Education Reform has created an even greater and more
intense political climate."
The challenge is formidable. A cooperative governance arrangement implies that all
sectors work together and that accountability is collective. From this perspective, school
committees, superintendents, principals, and school councils are in the governance
game together. Each plays a part in a collective enterprise that is judged on its overall
success — the educational achievement of students. A critical task is to combine this
collective accountability with the individual accountability of the corporate model. It
requires a means of assessment that discriminates between the collective and individual
responsibilities of governance actors. Principals, for example, are individually account-
able for their school buildings, but they are joined by other governance players in over-
all accountability for the educational performance of students. Measuring and assessing
such distinctions is difficult, as is establishing an acceptable system of rewards. Never-
theless, this is an important task that lies at the heart of improving educational gover-
nance.
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AppendixA
Survey Methodology
A survey questionnaire was mailed to all Massachusetts school committee members, su-
perintendents, and principals in the fall of 1996. School committee members received
theirs in a quarterly mailing from the Massachusetts Association of School Committees,
superintendents and principals in a regular Massachusetts Department of Education mail-
ing. Several questions were open-ended, while others used a five-point scale to assess the
respondents' impressions. Questions also sought information regarding various demo-
graphic and other background characteristics of the respondents. The response rate was as
follows:
Surveys
Mailed
Responses
Received
Percentage
Returned
School Committee Members
Superintendents
Principals
Total
2,200
280
1,830
4,310
391
138
428
957
18 percent
49 percent
23 percent
22 percent
Available demographic data for the entire population of each governance group form the
basis for the following comments on the representativeness of the responses.
School Committee Members. Compared with a 1995 membership survey conducted by
the Massachusetts Association of School Committees as characteristic of the entire state
population, my respondents are representative in terms of gender and education. Distribu-
tion of males and females in both is roughly equal, and approximately 50 percent of the
respondents and the school committee population have graduate or professional degrees.
In years of service, however, my group is more experienced. Among them, 58 percent had
five or more years of service on a school committee, whereas the comparable figure for the
state total is 34 percent..
Superintendents. Population characteristics for this group are based on an annual survey
conducted by the Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents. My survey
group is representative in terms of age and size of school district. Among both respon-
dents and the state population of superintendents, 34 percent are between the ages of 36
and 50, while 66 percent are 51 or older. By school district, 66 percent of my sample and
69 percent of the state population are superintendents of districts with enrollments be-
tween 1,000 and 5,000. In terms of years in their current governance role, my respondents
are more experienced than the typical total state population. Among all superintendents,
44 percent have been in their jobs for 1 to 3 years and 39 percent for 4 to 10 years. In my
survey, the comparable percentages are 24 percent and 52 percent, respectively. Again, as
with school committee members, my respondents are somewhat more experienced than
the overall state population.
Principals. The Massachusetts Department of Education reports that the gender distribu-
tion of state principals is 64 percent male and 36 percent female; my respondents reported
identical figures.
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